






Department of Economics 
Working Paper No. 0111 
http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/pub/wp/wp0111.pdf 
 






Abstract:  This paper investigates the welfare implications of an existence of a free trade agreement (FTA) 
and a customs union (CU) within the GATT. Two types of GATT regimes are considered in a completely 
symmetric world: a pure GATT regime without any type of the regional trade agreements (RTAs), and a 
modified GATT regime with one of them. The main results are for a range of sufficiently high discount 
rate, first that free trade and global welfare efficiency can be supported under the pure GATT regime but 
not under the modified regimes, and second that a country's ranking of the both regimes depends on (1) 
whether it belongs to an RTA or not and (2) which one of the RTAs it belongs to. The insight of these 
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1 Introduction 
 
     One of the most controversial issues in international trade is the impact of regional 
trade agreements on the multilateral trade liberalization under the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). In general, trade liberalization under the GATT/WTO has been successful in 
lowering average tariffs from over 40 percent in the late 1940’s to less than 5 percent 
today. However, many economists fear the proliferation of regional trade agreements
1 
within the GATT since they believe that the regional agreements allow for 
discriminatory trade policies and thus may restrict further trade liberalization. 
     GATT is an international trade organization that provides a set of rules under 
which countries can negotiate more liberal trade policies. The fundamental rule of the 
GATT in multilateral tariff negotiation is the non-discrimination principle, whereby 
the countries in the GATT must apply equal tariffs on all other GATT-member 
countries
2. However, the GATT has another set of rules
3 that give countries 
exceptions to the non-discrimination principle. Two types of exceptions may be 
                                                 
1 Since 1957, 143 regional trade agreements have been reported to the GATT, of which 82 are still in 
effect. For more details, visit WTO homepage, www.wto.org/wto/develop/webrtas.htm and see 
Bhagwati and Panarariya (1996). 
 
2 In Article I of the GATT, it is called `Most Favored Nation' clause, which requires that a trade 
concession granted to a country must be granted to all other countries on the basis of non-
discrimination. 
 
3 In Article XXIV of the GATT, paragraph 4 and 5 states that regional integrations are allowed as long 
as they facilitate world trade and do not raise barriers to trade with the rest of the world. For example, 
under the Article XXIV, European Community (1957, EC (or Treaty of Rome)), European Free Trade 
Association (1959, EFTA (or Stockholm Convention)), North American Free Trade Agreement (1993, 
NAFTA), and Central European Free Trade Area (1994, CEFTA) have been formed. Other GATT 
provisions such as Enabling Clause and Article V of GATS provide similar exceptions. For example, 
under Enabling Clause, Association of South East Asian Nations (1977, ASEAN), Latin American 
Integration Association (1982, LAIA), Asuncion Treaty (1992, MERCOSUR), and Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (1995, COMESA) have been formed. Under Article V of GATS, 
ANZCERTA (1995) and European Economic Area (1996, EEA) have been formed. 
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distinguished
4: free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs). In an FTA, 
each FTA-member country chooses its  own tariff for non-FTA-member countries. 
That is, a country in an FTA sets zero tariffs on imports from countries inside the 
FTA and independently selects external tariffs on goods from countries outside the 
FTA. A customs union differs in that union member countries are allowed to 
coordinate their external trade policies. That is, a country in a CU sets zero tariffs on 
goods from other countries inside the CU and cooperatively selects external tariffs on 
imports from countries outside the CU. However the existence of FTAs and CUs in 
the GATT system is somewhat puzzling since it contradicts the fundamental GATT 
principle of non-discrimination. 
     What are the consequences of the existence of FTAs and CUs in GATT? More 
specifically, what effect does the existence of FTAs and CUs have on (a) the 
multilateral trade liberalization and, consequently (b) global welfare as well as an 
individual country’s welfare? 
     To address these questions, this paper utilizes the static model developed by 
Bagwell and Staiger (1999). One of the most noticeable features of their static model 
is the fact that the model can show the tariff complementarity effect of regionalism. 
That is, the formation of a regional trade agreement works to reduce the optimal 
external tariffs against non-RTA member countries. Also in the static model they 
were able to show that such a complementary reduction of external tariffs is stronger 
in an FTA than in a CU because a CU member country is concerned about the 
negative impact of the reduction of external tariffs on the other union member.  
     However, this paper departs from their analysis in the dynamic model by 
considering a common discount rate for all countries; while their dynamic model is 
                                                 
4 In the Article XXIV, paragraph 8 defines FTAs and CUs.   3
symmetric only between RTA member countries, the dynamic model in this paper is 
completely symmetric. The modifications allow to rank the individual country’s 
welfare for either a case where some countries form regional trade agreements in the 
GATT system or the other where they do not. 
     Given the dynamic model where countries try to cooperate for free trade, each 
country’s incentive constraints (which implies that the benefit of deviation from an 
agreed-upon tariff is dominated by its cost) under two types of GATT regimes are 
examined: a pure GATT regime that does not allow for regional trade agreements and 
a modified GATT regime that allows either an FTA or a CU.   
     First, this paper shows that, for some range of sufficiently high discount rates, free 
trade can be supported under the pure GATT regime but it is not achievable under the 
modified regimes. More specifically, when the FTA member countries negotiate free 
trade with the non-member country, the non-member country is capable of choosing 
positive tariffs against member countries that will keep setting the same zero tariffs as 
in the pure GATT regime. The reason is that, the strong reduction of the optimal 
external tariffs works to reduce the non-member country’s cost of deviation from zero 
tariffs. In the case of a CU in the modified GATT regime, this paper shows that when 
the CU member countries negotiate free trade with the non-member, member 
countries will choose positive tariffs and the non-member will choose zero tariffs. The 
reason is that the weak reduction of the optimal external tariffs and the member’s 
external trade policy coordination work to increase the member’s benefit of deviation 
from the zero tariffs. 
     Then, this paper tries to rank welfare outcomes under a pure GATT regime and the 
two modified GATT regimes. Since only free trade maximizes global welfare, the 
pure GATT regime achieves the highest global welfare. However, a country’s ranking   4
of regimes depends on (1) whether it belongs to the regional trading agreement or not 
and (2) which type of RTAs it belongs to. When comparing the pure and FTA-
modified GATT regimes, an FTA member prefers the pure regime while a non-
member prefers the FTA-modified regime. However, when the comparison is between 
the pure and the CU-modified GATT regimes, a CU member prefers the CU-modified 
regime while a non-member prefers the pure regime. Intuitively, compared to the case 
of the pure GATT regime that yields free trade, the positive tariffs chosen by the CU 
member countries under the modified GATT regime will increase their welfare levels 
in importing sectors, while the tariffs hurt the non-member country’s exporting sector. 
On the contrary, in the case of the FTA, the positive tariffs chosen by the non-member 
country will reduce the welfare level of the exporting sectors in the FTA-member 
countries, while the tariffs benefit the non-member country’s importing sector. 
     These results have two implications for the incentives for member countries to 
support regional trade agreements in multilateral tariff negotiation: (1) When an FTA 
does not  achieve the highest global welfare the FTA is also bad for the individual 
members. Therefore, member countries will not support the FTA in the modified 
GATT regime. (2) However, even when a CU does not achieve the highest global 
welfare, the CU is good for the individual members. Therefore, they will support the 
CU in the modified regime.  
     In the existing literature, researchers support or criticize the role of regional trade 
agreements in multilateral trade liberalization for a variety of reasons. Papers that 
identify beneficial aspects of FTAs include Richardson (1993), Richardson (1995) 
and Bagwell and Staiger (1999). Papers that identify beneficial aspects of CUs 
include Bond, Syropoulos and Winters (1996) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999). On the 
other hand, Bond and Syropoulos (1995) identifies detrimental aspects of CUs. Papers   5
that yield mixed results are Bagwell and Staiger (1997a) for FTAs and Bagwell and 
Staiger (1997b) for CUs. In a static model, Richardson (1993, 1995) argues that an 
FTA complements multilateral trade liberalization since the member countries can 
reduce their external tariffs through competition for tariff revenues within the FTA. In 
an infinitely repeated game model, Bond and Syropoulos (1995) consider tariff 
negotiations among symmetric customs unions, and argue that the larger the CUs the 
more difficult it is to achieve free trade. However, Bond, Syropoulos and Winters 
(1996) extend it to consider an asymmetric case, and argue that the deepening of a 
customs union may enhance the ability of the multilateral agreement to secure low 
tariffs. Bagwell and Staiger (1997a, 1997b) consider a transitional period during 
which regional agreements are formed. In the former paper, they show that an FTA 
causes a temporary increase in the cooperative tariffs. The latter shows that a CU 
causes a temporary decrease in the tariffs. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) consider a case 
where regional trade agreements between two symmetrically patient countries are 
formed and engage in a multilateral agreement with one impatient country. They find 
that the lower the discount factor of the patient countries the more likely it is that 
regionalism will lower multilateral tariffs.  
     This paper modifies Bagwell and Staiger (1999)’s dynamic model by considering a 
common discount rate. By doing so, the contribution of this paper to the existing 
literature is to rank the individual country’s welfare when regional trade agreements 
in the GATT exist. The important implication of this analysis is that, even when all 
countries in the GATT are patient enough for a multilateral free trade agreement, they 
have an incentive to deviate to support regional trading blocs such as CUs (but not 
FTAs), which restricts free trade and thus hinders the highest global welfare outcome. 
   6
2 The Static Model
5 
 
     It is a simple, partial equilibrium exchange economy with three symmetric 
countries and three homogenous goods. Three countries are denoted by  A, B, and C, 
and three goods by a, b and c. Each country is endowed with only two goods (3/2 
units of each) and demands the three goods ( p p D b a - = ) (  for each goods). Each 
country imports a single good from the other two countries. The markets are perfectly 
competitive. The price of a good in each of the three countries must be such that 
agents cannot make profits by buying in one country and selling in another country 
for a higher price. If arbitrage opportunities exist the markets are not in equilibrium.  
     In this set up, each country chooses its own tariffs against the two exporters in 
order to maximize its own welfare, which is simply the sum of consumer surplus, 
producer surplus and tariff revenues. The welfare function of country  } , , { C B A I ˛  is 
given by: 
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i ” a good that corresponds to the lower case value of I (e.g., if i=A, then i=a).   
L(I) ” a country notation for a “Left-hand” trading partner of importing country I . 
R(I) ”  for a “Right-hand” partner. 
                                                 
5 This section briefly presents the static model developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999). See their 
paper for more details. 
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l(I) ” a export good notation for “left-hand” trading partner of exporting country I.  
r(I) ” for a “right-hand” partner.  
I
i p  (
) (I L
i p , 
) (I R
i p ) ”  the country I’s (L(I)’s, R(I)’s) local price for good i  
) (I L
i t  (
) (I R
i t ) ” the country I’s specific tariff on imports of good i from its “Left-hand” 
(“Right-hand”) trading partner.  
) (I l P ” the total surplus of exporters of good l(I). 
) (I L
i E   ” the volume of export of  L(I), which is equal to the volume of import from 
L(I). 
 
     Differentiating (1) with respect to 
) (I L
i t  and 
) (I R
i t  and setting the derivatives equal 
to zero, the best response functions for country I are: 
 
(2)     
) ( ) (



























     (2) shows the existence of a complementary relationship between the two imports 
tariffs. To see this, take country A and then observe that, as A’s tariff on the import of 
a from  B falls (rises), it becomes more attractive for country A to lower (raise) the 
tariff on import of  a from  C. This is the result of the following three reinforcing 
effects: (a) A higher 
C
a t  leads to a higher domestic prices for good a, which in turn 
implies that the consumer surplus cost of an increase in 
B
a t  is lower. (b) A higher 
C
a t  
leads to an increase in imports volume from B, which in turn implies that the increase 
in tariff revenue associated with an increase in 
B
a t  is higher. (c) With a higher 
C
a t , the   8
increase in tariff revenue associated with the increase in imports volume from  C due 
to the increase in 
B
a t  is higher. 
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tariffs. With (1), a country’s welfare is negatively affected by a tariff on its exports, 
but positively affected by a tariff on its competitor’s exports. The overall impact of an 
importing country’s tariff on exporting country welfare is negative, leading to a 
negative externality on all its trading partners. Efficiency (maximizing the sum of all 
three countries’ welfare functions) requires free trade. The Nash equilibrium involves 
too much protection. Countries are therefore faced with a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
problem due to the negative externality.  
     In the following subsections, Nash tariffs given a regional trade agreement such as 
an FTA or a CU will be presented.  
 
2.1 Nash Tariffs in the Presence of a Free Trade Agreement between A and B 
 
     Consider first the impact of a free trade agreement (FTA) between country A and B 
on external tariffs chosen by each country in the Nash equilibrium. The relevant 
utility maximization problems for FTA members and non-FTA members are as 
follows.  
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     Comparing multilateral tariffs in the presence of the FTA between  A and  B to 
multilateral tariffs in its absence, C’s tariff choices are unaffected by the FTA, but A 
and B choose to reduce their external tariffs as a result of the formation of the FTA. 
This implies that countries that eliminate tariffs against imports from a subset of their 
trading partners preferentially will be willing in a Nash equilibrium to liberalize 
external tariffs against their remaining trading partners as well. 
 
2.2 Nash Tariffs in the Presence of a Customs Union between A and B 
 
     Consider next the impact of a customs union (CU) between country A and B on 
external tariffs chosen by each country in the Nash equilibrium. The relevant utility 
maximization problems for CU members and non-CU members are as follows.  
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     Comparing multilateral tariffs in the presence of the CU between  A and  B to 
multilateral tariffs in its absence, the results are similar to the case of the FTA. 
However, the complementary reduction of the external tariff is weaker in the CU than 




t t t < <
~
. This is because members of a customs 
union are concerned about the  negative externality imposed on other customs union 
members when they lower their external tariff and thereby reduce the tariff advantage 
offered to their customs union partners. The reduction of the external tariff in a union   10
member country will reduce the relative export price in the other union member 
country. 
     In the next section 3 and 4, the analysis departs from Bagwell and Staiger (1999)’s 
dynamic model by considering a common discount rate for all three countries. In 
particular, with the common discount rate, multilateral tariff cooperation among them 
will be modeled as an infinite repetition of the static game. In the dynamic game, the 
three countries agree to cooperate until there is some deviation. If any country 
deviates, they all revert to playing their Nash tariffs forever. This repeated game can 
lead to subgame perfect equilibrium that involves cooperation and avoid the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma situation demonstrated in the static game. To see the 
consequences of the existence of regional trade agreements in the multilateral tariff 
cooperation, two types of regimes will be compared. The first regime will be called a 
pure GATT regime that does not allow for regional trade agreements. The second 
regime will be called a modified GATT regime that allows either an FTA or a CU.  
 
3 A Pure GATT Regime without Regional Trade Agreements 
 
     Let’s consider a pure GATT regime in which the three countries, A, B, and C, are 
forced to impose non-discriminatory tariffs on imports of the same good from all their 




i t t t ” =
) ( ) (  for 
} , , { C B A I ˛ , which means that an importing country is not allowed to set a 
discriminatory tariff rate. The multilateral agreement consists of a set of tariffs 
) , , ( ) ( ) ( I r I l i t t t , the lowest that can be supported by the threat of infinite Nash 
reversion. Due to the symmetry of model, the lowest cooperative tariffs are such that 
) ( ) ( I r I l i t t t = = .   11
     The per period benefit of deviating from these t ariffs is given by the difference 
between the welfare obtained by deviation to the optimal tariffs and that obtained by 
cooperating. That is: 
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N t  is the best response (Nash) tariffs. Recall that there is a dominant strategy 
in tariffs or, in other words, the best response tariff does not depend on the tariffs 
charged by other countries. The benefit of deviating is characterized by two main 
properties. The first is that, the lower the cooperative tariff is, the higher the benefit of 
deviating. The second is that, when there is no cooperation, the benefit of deviating is 
zero. The benefit of deviating must be compared to the cost of Nash reversion. 
     The per period cost of the deviation is given by the difference between the welfare 
obtained by cooperating and that obtained by Nash reversion. That is: 
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     The cost of deviation is increasing in a country’s own cooperative tariff and 
decreasing in other countries’ cooperative tariff. This is a result of the fact that higher 
tariffs of the country lead to increased tariff revenue and lower tariffs on the country’s 
export goods lead to higher producer’s surplus. Due to the symmetry in the   12
cooperative equilibrium, the cost of deviation can be rewritten as a function of a 
symmetric cooperative tariff. The cost of deviation is decreasing in the symmetric 
cooperative tariffs since the increased tariff revenue in an import sector of a country is 
dominated by the decreased producer’s surplus in the two export sectors of the 
country. 
     Now the incentive constraint faced by a country under the pure GATT regime is: 
 
(7)     









where  d is a discount rate for all countries. Let’s define an equilibrium non-
discriminatory tariff 
GATT pure t  as the lowest tariff that satisfies (7). As d  increases 
from 0 to 1, the discounted cost of the deviation increases and thus the lowest 
cooperative tariff rate that satisfies the incentive constraint decreases. Solving (7) for 
the lowest symmetric cooperative tariff with equality yields: 
 





















N GATT pure  
 
      Proposition 1 summarizes the consequences of the pure GATT regime. 
 
Proposition 1  When  ] 1 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , the pure GATT regime can achieve free 
trade and maximum global welfare.  
Proof: See Appendix 
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     The results in proposition 1 will be compared to the case of the modified GATT 
regime with an FTA and a CU, respectively.  
 
4 Modified GATT Regimes with Regional Trade Agreements 
 
     This section considers modified GATT regimes where a pair of countries is 
allowed to form a regional trade agreement such as an FTA or a CU
6. In fact, the 
modified GATT regime does not necessarily rule out a possibility that they would not 
form a regional trade agreement. However, this would yield the exactly same results 
as that of the pure GATT regime in the previous section. The following two 
subsections are such that, given that countries  A and  B formed a regional trade 
agreement, they continue to cooperate with non-RTA members.  
 
4.1 A Free Trade Agreement between A and B 
   
     This section assumes that countries  A and  B  formed an FTA and see its 
consequences on multilateral tariffs and welfare. 
     Within the FTA, countries  A and  B trade two goods  a and  b without duties 




a t t ). The symmetry between them implies that they will impose a 
symmetric multilateral tariff on imports from their external trading country (C), which 





e t t t = ” . Under the reversion to the Nash equilibrium, the FTA 
between them remains intact, and so the Nash punishment tariffs (dominant strategies) 
                                                 
6 In practice, the formation of a regional trade agreement has been allowed under GATT-Article XXIV. 
Actually this article has given almost all countries a way of getting out of the MFN clause. Dam (1970) 
explained that this was partly because Article XXIV has been misinterpreted and misused. However 
this paper assumes that there is no misinterpretation or misuse in Article XXIV by countries. 
   14
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C will continue to abide by the non-discrimination principle under t he multilateral 
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c .  
     To obtain the lowest cooperative tariffs in the presence of the FTA, incentive 
constraints for each country are constructed here. The per period benefit and cost of 
deviating from an agreed-upon tariff for a member in the FTA, given  c t , are: 
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     Note that, the lower the cooperative tariffs (
e t ) by an FTA member, the higher the 
benefit to deviate and the lower the cost of deviation. And, the lower the given tariffs 
( c t ) by the non-FTA member, the higher the cost of deviation. 
     Non-member country C’s benefit and cost of the deviation are: 
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     Note that, the lower the cooperative tariffs ( c t ) by the non-FTA country, the 
higher the benefit to deviate and the lower the cost of deviation. And, the lower the 
given tariffs (
e t ) by the FTA member, the higher the cost of deviation. 
     The incentive constraints of each of the members and non-member are: 
 
(13)     







(14)     








     (13) and (14) show that, the formation of the FTA affects a country’s incentive 
constraint and the constraint depends on whether the country belongs to the FTA or 
not. The proposition 2 summarizes the consequences of the existence of the FTA.  
 
Proposition 2  When  ] 7562502 . 0 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , the modified GATT regime with 
an FTA can not achieve free trade. Specifically, FTA member countries will choose 
zero external tariffs and the non-FTA member country will choose positive tariffs. 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
     When  ] 1 , 7562502 . 0 [ ˛ d , free trade can be supportable even in the modified 
GATT regimes, which makes them the same as the pure GATT regime. However, 
when  ] 7562502 . 0 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , the proposition shows a possibility that free trade 
is not achievable if the FTA exists in the GATT. This is an interesting result that can 
be compared to those from the pure GATT regimes in proposition 1. According to 
proposition 1, for that range of the discount rates, the pure GATT regime can achieve   16
free trade. However, when there is an FTA in the GATT, proposition 2 proves that the 
non-FTA member country chooses positive tariffs while FTA countries keep setting 
zero tariffs. This is because of the complementary reduction of external tariff. That is, 
the formation of the FTA makes the FTA members choose the smaller optimal 
external tariffs. Then, this works to reduce the non-member country’s cost of 
deviation since the level of retaliation by the FTA member decreases. So, the non-
member country is capable of increasing its cooperative tariffs.  
     Proposition 3 shows the welfare implications of the set of lowest cooperative 
tariffs. In particular, a country’s ranking of the GATT regime will be affected by the 
formation of the free trade agreement. 
 
Proposition 3 When  ] 7562502 . 0 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , the FTA member countries prefer 
the pure GATT regime, but the non-FTA member country prefers the modified GATT 
regime. The global welfare under the modified GATT regime with the FTA is smaller 
than under the pure GATT regime. 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
     Intuitively, when the non-FTA member sets the positive tariffs against the FTA 
member countries, it will hurt the export sector within the FTA, while the tariffs 
protect the import sector of the non-FTA member country so the welfare will increase. 
This result has an implication for the incentive for member countries to support the 
FTA in multilateral tariff negotiation: when the FTA does not achieve the maximum 
global welfare, it is also bad for the FTA member country’s welfare. Therefore they 
will not support the FTA in the modified GATT regime. Rather they prefer the pure 
GATT regime.   17
 
4.2 Customs Union between A and B 
 
     This section repeats the same analysis as above, but for a different regional trade 
agreement, a customs union (CU), between a pair of countries, A and B. Unlike an 
FTA in which an external tariff of one country is independent of that of the other, 
countries in a CU are coordinating their trade policies. 
     This section assumes that countries A and B formed a customs union and see the 
consequences of the CU on multilateral tariffs, each country’s welfare and world 
welfare. 
     Within the CU, countries  A  and  B trade two goods  a and  b without duties 




a t t ). The symmetry between them implies that they will impose a 
symmetric multilateral tariff on imports from their external trading country (C), which 





e t t t = ” . However, under the reversion to the Nash equilibrium, 
the CU between them remains intact, and so the Nash punishment tariffs (dominant 
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the CU between A and B will reduce the effectiveness with which these countries can 
punish C with a high tariff, but the ability of A and B to punish C will not be reduced 
to the extent that it would be under a free trade agreement between these two 
countries. Finally, country  C will continue to abide by the non-discrimination 
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     To solve the lowest cooperative tariff in the presence of CU, first, let’s consider 
the per period benefit and cost when a member of a CU deviates from agreed-upon 
tariff. 
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     Note that, the lower the cooperative tariffs (
e t ) by a CU member, the higher the 
benefit of deviating and the lower the cost of deviation. And, the lower the given 
cooperative tariffs ( c t ) by the non-CU member, the higher the cost of deviation. 
     Non-member country C’s benefit and cost of the deviation are: 
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     Note that, the lower the cooperative tariffs ( c t ) by the non-CU country, the higher 
the benefit of deviating and the lower the cost of deviation. And, the lower the given 
tariffs (
e t ) by the CU member, the higher the cost of deviation.   19
     The incentive constraints of each of the members and non-member are: 
 
(19)     
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     The proposition 4 summarizes the consequences of the existence of the CU in the 
GATT.  
 
Proposition 4 When  ] 9142857 . 0 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , the modified GATT regime with a 
CU cannot achieve free trade. Specifically, CU member countries will choose positive 
external tariffs and the non-CU member country will choose zero tariffs. 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
     From proposition 1, when  ] 9142857 . 0 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , the pure GATT regime 
can achieve free trade since the range is a subset of  ] 1 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d . However, 
proposition 4 shows that free trade cannot be achievable if the CU exists in the 
GATT. Moreover, when there is a CU in the GATT, the CU member country chooses 
positive tariffs while the non-CU countries keep setting zero tariffs. This is a different 
result from the case of FTA. This is because, first, the reduction of CU’s external 
tariffs is not as big as that of FTA’s, and second, the CU members are coordinating 
their external trade policies.        
     Proposition 5 shows the welfare implications of the set of lowest cooperative 
tariffs. In particular, a country’s ranking of the GATT regime will be affected by the 
formation of the customs union.   20
 
Proposition 5  When  ] 9142857 . 0 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , the CU member countries prefer 
the modified GATT regime, but the non-CU member country prefers the pure GATT 
regime. The global welfare under the modified GATT regime with the CU is smaller 
than under the pure GATT regime. 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
     Intuitively, due to the fact the free trade cannot be achieved in this case, the global 
welfare is smaller than the case o f the pure GATT regime. For each individual 
country’s welfare changes, when the CU member sets positive tariffs against the 
nonmember country, it will hurt the export sector of the non-CU member country (so 
the level welfare will decrease), while the tariffs protect the import sector of the CU 
member country (so the level of welfare will increase). This result implies that, even 
when the CU does not achieve the maximum global welfare, the formation of the CU 
is good for the CU member country’s welfare. Therefore they will support the CU in 
the modified GATT regime. 
     The following proposition 6 is the last case where the modified GATT regime 
allows both an FTA and a CU, and shows a country’s optimal choice of regimes. 
 
Proposition 6  When  ] 9142857 . 0 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , if both an FTA and a CU are 
allowed in the modified GATT regime, the CU is strictly preferred.  
Proof: See Appendix 
 
     This proposition is corollary from the previous propositions, but it gives an 
interesting implication for the current GATT regime that allows for the formation of   21
both FTAs and CUs. This proposition suggests that the current GATT regime may 
restrict free trade and thus fail to achieve the highest global welfare.  
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
 
     This paper argued that the exceptions to non-discrimination principle in the current 
GATT system might hinder free trade even if all countries in the system were patient 
enough for multilateral free trade cooperation. In particular, a welfare gain of a 
member in a CU, as a result of multilateral tariff negotiation with non-CU-member, is 
higher than a case of the non-member. So, a group of countries under the current 
GATT system has an incentive to form a CU before they participate in multilateral 
free trade negotiation. In the case of FTAs, however, they would not have such an 
incentive. This is because an FTA-member’s ability of setting a high external tariff 
against non-member would be weaker than the member’s ability in case of a CU. 
     While these results are rather specific to the case of  multilateral  free trade 
cooperation between an RTA-member and a non-RTA-member, it can be easily 
generalized to a case where they both are not patient enough for free trade, which 
would yield an entire picture of all possibilities. However, this paper focused on the 
possibility of free trade in the current GATT system where regionalism is allowed in 
multilateral tariff negotiations. The conclusion of this paper is that it is needed to 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition1 
The proof is very straightforward. When  d=0.5714285=4/7, the lowest cooperative 
tariff from (8) is 0. When  d>4/7, zero cooperative tariffs satisfy the incentive 
constraint of (7). So, the pure GATT system can achieve free trade. Moreover, the 
global welfare maximization problem yields zero tariffs for all countries:  
) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( 3
I W  is a maximum level of global welfare under the pure GATT regime. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
First of all, if set 
e t =0 in (13) given  c t =0, the discount rate that satisfies an FTA-
member’s incentive constraint is  ] 1 , 367417 . 0 [ ˛ d . If set  c t =0 in (14) given 
e t =0, it 
gives  ] 1 , 7562502 . 0 [ ˛ d  for the non-FTA member country. This implies that when 
] 7562502 . 0 , 367417 . 0 [ ˛ d , free trade under the modified GATT regime with the 
FTA can not be supported. More specifically, since the discount rate for that range is 
less than 0.7562502, the non-FTA member will choose  c t >0, given 
e t =0, so as to 
satisfy the incentive constraint (14). Alternatively, when 
e t = c t =0, 
GATT pure G =
nonFTA G  
from (5) and ( 11), while 
GATT pure L >
nonFTA L  from (6) and (12) since 




. This implies that, when 
e t =0 in that range of 
discount rates, the lowest cooperative tariff  c t  must be greater than 0 in (14). Next, 
from (10), 
FTA L  with 
e t =0 < c t  is smaller than with 
e t =0= c t . Therefore, the critical 
discount rate for FTA member country to support 
e t =0 must be greater than 
0.367417 if  c t >0. Hence, when  ] 7562502 . 0 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , the two incentive 
constraints support 
e t =0< c t .  
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
When  ] 7562502 . 0 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , from proposition 1 and 2, 
GATT pure t =0 and 
e t =0< c t . Then, since 0< c t <
N
c t =
N t = b 8 / 3 , the welfare changes o f an FTA 
member and non-FTA member countries are respectively: 
 




( ) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( ) , ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( < - = - c c
I
c c
FTA W W t
b
t t t  





( ) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( ) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; , ( > - = - c c
I
c c
nonFTA W W t
b
t t t  
 
The global welfare change is, using the above two results: 
 
      0 ] [ ] [ 2 ] 3 [ ] 2 [ < - + - = - +
I nonFTA I FTA I nonFTA FTA W W W W W W W .      
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
First of all, if set 
e t =0 in (19) given  c t =0, the discount rate that satisfies a CU-
member’s incentive constraint is  ] 1 , 9142857 . 0 [ ˛ d . If set  c t =0 in (20) given 
e t =0, 
it gives  ] 1 , 390625 . 0 [ ˛ d  for the non-CU member country. This implies that when   23
] 9142857 . 0 , 390625 . 0 [ ˛ d , free trade under the modified GATT regime with the CU 
can not be supported. More specifically, since the discount rate for that range is less 
than 0.9142857, a CU member will choose 
e t >0 given  c t =0, so as to satisfy the 
incentive constraint of (19). Then, from (18), it is easy to verify that 
nonCU L  with 
c t =0<
e t  is smaller than with  c t =0=
e t . Therefore, the critical discount rate for non-
CU member country to support  c t =0 must be greater than 0.390625 if 
e t >0. Hence, 
when  ] 9142857 . 0 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , the non-member’s incentive constraint is satisfied 
with  c t =0<
e t .   
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
When  ] 9142857 . 0 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , from proposition 1 and 4, 
GATT pure t =0 and 
c t =0<





t = b 10 / 3 , the welfare changes of a CU member and 
non-CU member countries are respectively: 
 





( ) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( ) 0 , 0 ; , 0 ; , 0 ( > - = -
e e I e e CU W W t
b
t t t  





( ) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( ) , 0 ; , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( < - = -
e e I e e nonCU W W t
b
t t t  
 
The global welfare change is, using the above two results: 
 
      0 ] [ ] [ 2 ] 3 [ ] 2 [ < - + - = - +
I nonCU I CU I nonCU CU W W W W W W W .                          
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
The proof is straightforward from the proposition 3 and 5. That is, when a pair of 
countries chooses to form a CU, the multilateral tariff negotiation with non-member 
country yields the result, for the range of discount rates: 
 
      ) , ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( ) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( ) 0 , 0 ; , 0 ; , 0 ( c c
FTA I e e CU W W W t t t t ‡ > .                            
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